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The Tax Revenue Capacity of the 
U.S. Economy
James R. Hines Jr.
Summary: The United States imposes smaller tax burdens than do 
other large high-income countries, its 24.8 percent ratio of tax col-
lections to GDP in 2010 representing the lowest fraction among the 
G-7. The United States also differs from other G-7 countries in rely-
ing relatively little on expenditure-type taxes. It follows that there 
is significant unused tax capacity in the United States that could 
be deployed to pay the country’s debts, but that the most promis-
ing source of additional tax revenue is expenditure taxation that is 
widely perceived to have very different distributional features than 
the income taxes on which the U.S. government currently relies. The 
extent to which the country is able, politically and economically, to 
incur greater tax burdens to pay its debts may therefore depend on 
its willingness to adopt a tax system that more heavily emphasizes 
taxing expenditures.
1. Introduction
Politics famously impedes cogent discussion of long-run government 
budget issues, but for all of the partisan controversy over U.S. fiscal 
policy, there is little dispute over the plain fact that the United States 
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government rapidly accumulated debt following the crash of 2008. 
At year-end 2007, the value of U.S. government debt held by the 
public was equal to 36.3 percent of U.S. GDP.1 By year-end 2011, 
that figure had risen to 67.7 percent of GDP, and, in March 2012, 
the Congressional Budget Office (2012) estimated that, in their “al-
ternative fiscal scenario” intended to offer an optimistic but nonethe-
less more realistic projection than official baselines, U.S. debt held by 
the public would rise from 73.3 percent of GDP at year-end 2012 
to 93.2 percent of GDP by year-end 2022. This accumulation of 
U.S. public debt reflects the impact of the recession that followed 
the crash of 2008, including the accompanying tax cuts and spend-
ing increases. Deficits are projected to average 5.3 percent of GDP 
over the 2012-2022 decade; and these figures generally understate 
total obligations, since debt held by the public is only a portion (69.7 
percent as of 2012) of total U.S. government indebtedness.
This very rapid accumulation of U.S. government debt is troubling 
to many observers, who worry about the political and economic re-
percussions of shifting burdens to future generations of taxpayers, 
the macroeconomic consequences of large amounts of debt, the ef-
ficiency cost of raising taxes to meet future interest and principal 
payments, and simply whether the U.S. economy is capable of gener-
ating sufficient tax revenues to satisfy debt obligations along with fi-
nancing annual expenditures. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate 
the ability of the U.S. economy to meet current and future govern-
ment funding needs, and the implications for tax policy of actually 
undertaking to do so.
Some comfort can be found in the experiences of other G-7 coun-
tries, all of which collect significantly greater tax revenues as a frac-
tion of GDP than does the United States. To the extent that these 
countries offer reasonable guides to the type of policy the United 
States might adopt, it follows that there is ample ability of the United 
States to finance projected interest and principle payments on its 
debt. This is not to say that addressing U.S. fiscal imbalances could 
be easily accomplished. Other G-7 countries that raise significant tax 
1 These estimates and others are drawn from data provided by the Congressional 
Budget Office, www.cbo.gov, and in which years are U.S. government fiscal years. 
March 2012 projections are reported in Congressional Budget Office (2012).
115James R. Hines Jr
revenue rely on expenditure-basis taxes that differ significantly from 
the income taxes that are the mainstay of U.S. federal tax collec-
tions. Furthermore, the greater government expenditures that typi-
cally accompany higher taxes in these countries make the taxes more 
tolerable politically than they would be simply in the service of debt 
repayment.
Tax policies ultimately represent the outcomes of political processes 
that express the willingness of citizens to subject themselves to taxa-
tion. Tax alternatives differ in the extent to which they distort econo-
mies and in the distribution of their burdens. As aggregate burdens 
rise, the consequences of inefficient taxes become increasingly severe, 
thereby moving even intractable political processes in the direction 
of adopting efficient taxes. This is evident in the widespread use of 
consumption-based taxes in most of the world. It is a sad reality 
that countries must be forced by events to undertake efficient tax 
reforms – though this pattern may carry promising implications for 
U.S. policy as the country confronts its own debt burdens.
2. U.S. Taxation in Global Perspective
 
Throughout the modern era, the United States has maintained a 
smaller public sector than the other large high-income countries in 
the G-7 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United 
Kingdom). This entails correspondingly lower total tax burdens. The 
large U.S. deficits of 2007-2012 are the products of declining tax 
collections and rising government expenditures, but even prior to 
the crash of 2008, or for that matter prior to the 2000s, U.S. tax col-
lections were low compared to those of other high income countries.
 
Table 1 presents OECD statistics on total (federal plus subnational) 
tax revenues as a fraction of GDP in G-7 countries in 2006 and 
2010, which are representative years before and after 2008.2 In 2006 
U.S. tax revenues were 27.9 percent of GDP, representing the low-
est fraction among G-7 countries. Japan was a close second at 28.0 
percent, Canada third at 33.3 percent, and others higher. By 2010 
2 These and other OECD tax data presented in Tables 1-5 are available at: http://
www.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/data/revenue-statistics_ctpa-rev-data-en.
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U.S. tax revenues had fallen to 24.8 percent of GDP, still the lowest 
among the G-7 countries, the 3.1 percent of GDP U.S. tax revenue 
drop between 2006 and 2010 also representing the greatest percent-
age decline of all the G-7 countries.
Table 1: Total Tax Revenue as a Percentage of GDP
Source: OECD StatExtracts, http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?QueryId=21699.
Note to Table 1: The entries represent ratios of total government (federal, state and local) tax collections to 
national GDPs in 2006 and 2010.
Th e United States, which had relatively modest tax collections prior 
to 2008, responded to the crash by reducing taxes more signifi cantly 
than did the other G-7 countries. Falling incomes due to the crash 
had the eff ect of reducing both GDP and tax collections, with taxes 
typically declining more than GDP, due to the progressive nature 
of taxes in these countries and the sensitivity of business profi ts to 
macroeconomic conditions. Furthermore, all of these countries en-
acted tax cuts and delayed tax increases in eff orts to stimulate their 
economies. Th at these tax-cutting eff orts are reversible has been 
demonstrated by the United Kingdom and others subsequently talk-
ing steps to address long-run fi scal balance.
 
Th e most obvious diff erence between U.S. tax policy and the poli-
cies of other G-7 countries – indeed, the tax policies of almost any 
other country in the world – is that there is no U.S. value added 
tax (VAT).3 A VAT is a sophisticated form of a sales tax, and has 
proven immensely popular among governments around the world; 
since 1966, more than 150 countries have adopted VATs. Among the 
high-income OECD countries, 33 out of 34 have VATs; the United 
3 While there has never been a U.S. federal VAT, for a period of time the state of 
Michigan imposed a business tax with many VAT-like features (Hines, 2003).
117James R. Hines Jr
States is the lone exception. A VAT has the attractive property of 
not taxing the return to saving and investing, and thereby not dis-
couraging business formation or expansion; furthermore, VATs are 
commonly believed to be more easily enforced than are other taxes. 
Despite these features, the U.S. federal government has consistently 
resisted adopting a VAT, reflecting liberal concerns that the VAT is 
insufficiently progressive and conservative concerns that the VAT too 
readily facilitates the tax collections necessary to support big govern-
ment.
 
Despite its aversion to VATs, the United States uses some expendi-
ture-based taxes.  Most U.S. states impose general sales taxes at rates 
that are significantly below VAT rates in other countries. Further-
more, there are federal and state excise taxes on specific goods and 
services, such as gasoline, cigarettes, and alcohol; but overall U.S. 
taxes on goods and services are low compared to equivalent tax rates 
in other countries.4
 
Table 2 presents ratios of taxes on goods and services to GDP for G-7 
countries in 2006 and 2010. The numerator includes VAT, sales, and 
excise tax revenues.  The United States has the lowest ratio, collecting 
4.5 percent of GDP in goods and services taxes in 2010. Japan is the 
next lowest country at 5.1 percent, Canada follows at 7.5 percent, 
and the European G-7 countries are all above 10 percent. It indeed 
appears that VATs can be used effectively to collect significant rev-
enues from expenditures on goods and services.
U.S. taxes on goods and services declined from 4.8 percent of GDP 
in 2006 to 4.5 percent in 2010, but this was much more modest 
than the drop in total tax revenues. Expenditure taxes offer revenue 
streams that are more stable over the business cycle than are the rev-
enue streams produced by many income tax alternatives. Legislative 
changes actually increased the fraction of GDP collected by expendi-
ture taxes in some other G-7 countries between 2006 and 2010, with 
only Canada and France showing declines of comparable magnitude 
to the U.S. change.
4 Hines (2007) reviews the history and impact of U.S. sales and excise taxation.
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Table 2: Taxes on Goods and Services as a Percentage of GDP
Source: OECD StatExtracts, http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?QueryId=21699.
Note to Table 2: The entries represent ratios of total government (federal, state and local) tax collections on 
goods and services to national GDPs, expressed as percentages, in 2006 and 2010.
Other governments, particularly those of high-tax continental Eu-
rope, fi nance signifi cant portions of their expenditures with social 
insurance taxes. Th ese taxes are typically imposed at fl at rates, and 
only on labor-type income; their revenues are dedicated to certain 
categories of social expenditures. As a result of their fl at-rate struc-
ture, these social insurance taxes appear to be much less progres-
sive than income tax alternatives (though the expenditures they fund 
tend to be highly progressive). Th e comparatively small size of U.S. 
old-age social insurance programs, together with a reluctance to use 
fl at-rate taxes to fi nance general social expenditures, means that the 
United States relies much less than do some other countries on social 
insurance taxes.
Table 3 presents statistics on the use of social insurance taxes by G-7 
countries.  Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom rely 
the least on social insurance taxes, as measured by tax collections as 
a fraction of GDP. In 2010, the United States collected social insur-
ance taxes equal to 6.5 percent of GDP, Canada collected taxes equal 
to 4.8 percent of GDP, and the United Kingdom collected taxes 
equal to 6.7 percent of GDP, all of these ratios roughly unchanged 
since 2006. All four of Japan, Italy, Germany and France in 2010 
collected social insurance taxes equal to 11 percent or more of GDP.
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Table 3: Social Security Taxes as a Percentage of GDP
Source: OECD StatExtracts, http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?QueryId=21699.
Note to Table 3: The entries represent ratios of total government (federal, state and local) social insurance 
tax collections to national GDPs, expressed as percentages, in 2006 and 2010.
Th e United States relies relatively heavily on personal income taxes, 
and to a lesser extent on corporate income taxes. As a result, U.S. tax 
collections from these sources, measured as a fraction of GDP, look 
similar to those of other countries, despite the signifi cantly smaller 
size of the U.S. government. Personal – and particularly corporate – 
tax collections move over time with the business cycle, but in general 
the United States does not diff er sharply from other G-7 countries in 
total income tax collections as a fraction of GDP.
Table 4 presents personal income tax collections as a fraction of GDP. 
In 2006, U.S. personal income tax collections were 10.1 percent of 
GDP, a ratio greater than those of France, Germany, and Italy, and 
thereby representing the median ratio for the G-7 that year.  By 2010 
U.S. tax cuts had reduced personal tax collections to 8.0 percent of 
GDP, leaving only Japan and France with smaller ratios.
Table 5 presents corporate tax collections as a fraction of GDP. In 
2006, U.S. corporate tax collections represented 3.4 percent of GDP, 
exceeding the ratios of Germany and France, and equaling that of 
Italy. Between 2006 and 2010, corporate tax collections fell as a frac-
tion of GDP in every G-7 country, refl ecting primarily the decline in 
corporate profi ts associated with the recession that followed the crash 
of 2008, and to a much smaller extent the reactions of government 
policies. By 2010, U.S. corporate tax collections were only 2.7 per-
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cent of GDP, still ahead of Germany and France, very close to Italy 
and Japan at 2.8 percent, and not far behind the United Kingdom 
and Canada.
Table 4: Individual Income Tax Revenue as a Percentage of GDP
Source: OECD StatExtracts, http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?QueryId=21699.
Note to Table 4: The entries represent ratios of total government (federal, state and local) individual income 
tax collections to national GDPs, expressed as percentages, in 2006 and 2010.
Table 5: Corporate Tax Revenue as a Percentage of GDP
Source: OECD StatExtracts, http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?QueryId=21699.
Note to Table 5: The entries represent ratios of total government (federal, state and local) corporate tax col-
lections to national GDPs, expressed as percentages, in 2006 and 2010.
3. Implications for Future U.S. Tax Policy
It is clear that U.S. government fi nances diff er signifi cantly from 
those of other large high-income countries. To the extent that valid 
inferences can be drawn from cross-country comparisons, the expe-
riences of other G-7 countries suggest that there is signifi cant un-
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tapped federal tax revenue capacity in the United States, particularly 
among expenditure and social insurance taxes. While there are dif-
ferences between the U.S. economy and the economies of other G-7 
countries, these differences carry no obvious implications for their 
relative abilities to generate tax revenue. Lower U.S. tax revenue as a 
fraction of GDP is the product of deliberate policy choices made by 
successive U.S. governments, and reflects an unwillingness to incur 
the tax cost of supporting a larger public sector. There are certainly 
impediments to increasing U.S. tax collections, but these largely fall 
into the category of considerations that raise the cost of greater taxa-
tion, not factors that prevent the government from generating higher 
levels of tax revenue.
Tax compliance is an important ingredient in producing significant 
tax collections. The United States currently has among the lowest 
measured tax evasion rates in the world, with a shadow economy – 
the part of the economy not reported to tax authorities – estimated 
to account for between between 8 and 16 percent of GDP (Schnei-
der et al., 2010; Slemrod, 2007). In the cross-country estimates of-
fered by Schneider et al., U.S. underground activity represents just 
8.6 percent of the economy, the second lowest fraction in the world 
(Switzerland is the lowest at 8.5 percent). The other G-7 economies 
have significantly larger underground sectors, including Canada, at 
15.7 percent of GDP, Germany, at 16.0 percent, and Italy, much 
higher at 27.0 percent. The very low U.S. tax evasion rate makes it 
possible to obtain greater tax revenue than would otherwise be avail-
able, though tax evasion rates are apt to rise with higher tax rates.
It is one thing to have the ability to raise taxes, another to have the 
willingness. There are significant political costs associated with higher 
taxes, particularly if the higher taxes are not accompanied by greater 
spending on social or other programs that the electorate values. This 
is not to say that the country is unwilling to incur these costs. The 
history of U.S. federal government debt is one of accumulation dur-
ing wartime and decline during the subsequent peace. Indeed, the 
first U.S. federal taxes were excises imposed early in the Washington 
administration to pay off debts from the revolutionary war, a process 
that, together with land sales, led ultimately to the extinguishment 
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of the federal debt by 1837. Subsequent debt accumulations during 
the Civil War, the Spanish-American War, World War I, and World 
War II were likewise, albeit not quite as dramatically, diminished by 
frugality after these wars. There may be reason for concern that U.S. 
politics has evolved to a point at which it is difficult to summon the 
political will to impose short-term costs in the service of long-run 
sound fiscal management; though the focus of this essay is not on the 
politics of debt repayment, but instead on the underlying economics 
of the options facing the U.S. government.
The potential economic consequences of greater taxation include dis-
couraging labor supply, saving, investment, business formation, ef-
ficient asset allocation, and other choices that affect the performance 
of the economy. The cost of lost economic efficiency associated with 
higher taxation depends critically on which taxes the government 
chooses to deploy in order to raise revenue. Feldstein (2006) esti-
mates that an across-the-board increase in U.S. personal income 
taxes would be associated with an efficiency cost of 76 cents per dol-
lar of additional tax revenue. This figure is based on estimates of the 
responsiveness of taxable income to changes in tax rates, a method 
that is controversial, and which some critics argue overstates the 
magnitude of deadweight loss (Saez et al., 2012), though it is clear 
that higher U.S. personal income taxes would generate economic 
distortions of significant magnitude.
The U.S. government could raise additional revenue without resort-
ing to higher personal income taxes. VATs, social insurance taxes, and 
carefully chosen excise taxes have the potential to generate significant 
tax revenues at considerably smaller cost to the economy than a gen-
eral expansion in the personal income tax, since these tax alternatives 
have flatter rates than the personal income tax, and effectively tax 
the return to saving little if at all. Whether the United States would 
have an interest in a significant expansion of these taxes in preference 
to the individual income tax turns largely on the perceived tradeoff 
between the distributional objectives of the tax system and the desire 
to maintain efficient incentives.
Countries differ in the extent to which taxes are apt to distort their 
economies. Higher tax collections are generally associated with great-
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er economic costs of raising additional tax revenues, since the effi-
ciency cost of taxation rises roughly proportionately with the square 
of tax rates (Auerbach and Hines, 2002). Consequently, countries 
with the greatest tax revenue needs will tax themselves to the point 
that additional tax revenue is associated with significant economic 
distortions. These high-tax countries stand to benefit the most from 
adopting efficient tax structures, typically consisting of a combina-
tion of expenditure taxes and income taxes with relatively flat tax 
rates. In practice, tax system design appears to be sensitive to the 
costs of economic distortions. Lindert (2004) reports that countries 
with large government sectors tend to have less progressive tax sys-
tems than countries with small government sectors, reflecting the 
cost of high-rate progressive taxes. There is also almost a mechani-
cal relationship between tax collections and the extent of measured 
tax progressivity. Consider an extreme case in which the government 
represents 99 percent of the economy, and is financed by income 
taxes. The tax system would need to extract virtually all of private 
income, in which case income tax rates must average 99 percent, 
and would therefore have a nearly flat structure. This is obviously a 
fanciful example, but it illustrates that the decline of tax progressivity 
at high tax collection levels is a function not only of the rising eco-
nomic cost of collecting tax revenue, but also of the need for broad-
based taxes to support large governments.
Factors that contribute to the economic cost of heavy taxation in-
clude not only high tax rates themselves, but also a high degree of 
responsiveness of economic activity to taxation. There is ample evi-
dence that, in the modern era, economic activity has become consid-
erably more responsive than before to taxation, this sensitivity being 
attributable in large part to technology changes and the globalization 
of the world economy. Firms seeking to maximize after-tax returns 
have extensive options among production locations, suppliers, and 
final markets, all located in jurisdictions with potentially very dif-
ferent taxes. High tax rates discourage economic activity in part by 
encouraging the activity to relocate to tax-friendlier jurisdictions. 
Governments attempting to raise significant tax revenue in this envi-
ronment are understandably loath to do so with taxes that have the 
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effect of driving businesses to other locations. As a result, the range 
of attractive tax options narrows to those whose burdens are largely 
borne by fixed local factors, specifically land and labor, as land is 
unable to relocate and labor is often not much more mobile than 
land. Given that land is simply not valuable enough for land taxes to 
finance much of the needs of modern governments, it follows that la-
bor taxes are instead likely to represent the mainstay of modern gov-
ernment finance. Labor income can be taxed in many guises, includ-
ing by personal income taxes, social insurance contributions, and 
expenditure taxes. Of these, personal income taxes bear only partly 
on labor income, as personal income that forms the tax base com-
monly includes returns to saving and investing. By contrast, social 
insurance taxes are usually flat-rate taxes on wages and salaries, and 
expenditure taxes do not (in present value) tax the expected return to 
saving and investing, so effectively tax labor income. Consequently, 
modern developments give governments strong incentives to rely on 
social insurance and expenditure taxes.
There is evidence that governments have responded to these incen-
tives. Small countries, whose economies depend to the greatest ex-
tent on international trade and foreign investment, and who there-
fore have long faced more elastic tax bases than larger countries, rely 
on corporate and personal taxes much less than do large countries. 
Small countries largely use expenditure taxes instead of income taxes. 
In a cross-sectional study of national tax patterns in 1999, Hines and 
Summers (2009) report that a ten percent smaller national popula-
tion is associated with a one percent smaller ratio of personal and 
corporate income tax collections to total tax revenues. Over time, the 
experience of small countries is likely to become the experience of all 
countries, as technological advances, and accompanying globaliza-
tion, increase the elasticity of economic activity to taxation, pushing 
governments ever more strongly in the direction of taxing fixed labor 
rather than mobile business capital.
4. Conclusion
Throughout the modern era, the United States has maintained a 
smaller government sector than have other large high-income coun-
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tries, and consequently U.S. tax collections have represented a rela-
tively small fraction of national income. This pattern can be viewed 
in two ways. From one perspective, there appears to be significant 
unused tax capacity in the United States, so the tax increases neces-
sary to finance significant U.S. government debts are well within the 
capacity of the U.S. economy.  From another perspective, the United 
States in recent decades has demonstrated that it is unwilling to de-
mand of its residents large tax payments. This tension, between the 
capacity of the economy and the realities of political decision mak-
ing, leaves the course of future policy far from certain.
Some aspects of future tax policy have predictable features. It is un-
likely that business and personal income taxes will be used to gener-
ate significant additional future tax revenues, since current economic 
forces, if anything, put downward pressure on these taxes. Since the 
United States has relied to a greater extent on income taxation than 
have other high-income countries, reducing reliance on income taxes 
entails a significant restructuring of revenue sources. The additional 
resources necessary to pay the country’s debts are likely to come in-
stead from social insurance and expenditure taxes. Consequently, 
greater U.S. tax collections in the future will almost surely entail 
a tax system that is less progressive than is the current U.S. system. 
This reality generates considerable political anguish, which may be a 
good part of the reason why the country has for so long put off deal-
ing with its fiscal imbalances.
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